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ABSTRACT 
This paper describes the aggregate rural capital markets of the EU and the main differences between 
the markets of its member countries. The results of our study suggest that the agricultural credit 
markets are still quite segmented and the segments are country- rather than currency- or region-
specific. Financial instability in Europe is also penetrating the agricultural sector and the variation of 
interest rates for agricultural credit is increasing across countries. Perhaps the most dramatic signal of 
growing financial instability is that the financial leverage (gearing rate) of European farms rose in 
2008 by almost 4 percentage points, from 14 to 18%. The 4 percentage-point annual rise was twice the 
2 percentage-point rise observed during the economic recession in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The 
distribution of the financial leverage of agriculture across countries does not, however, reflect the 
distribution of country-specific risk premiums in the manner that they are observed in government 
bond yields. Therefore, in those countries that have the weakest financial situation in the public sector 
and in which the bond markets are encumbered with high country-specific risk premiums, the 
agricultural sector is not directly exposed to a very large risk of increasing interest rates, since it is not 
so highly leveraged. For example in Greek and Spanish agriculture, the financial leverage (gearing) 
rate is only 0.6% and 2.2% respectively, while the highest gearing rates are found elsewhere (in 
Denmark), reaching 50%.  
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Introduction 
Because money moves fast, modern capital markets should be better integrated across 
different market regimes than labour and commodity markets. Thus, local, rural capital 
markets should be closely linked not only to the domestic financial market within the country 
but increasingly so to the EU and even to global financial markets. Recently, it has become 
evident that under the modern financial systems, information, large economic shocks and the 
instability observed in the international markets are also inevitably transmitted to the local 
capital markets. The sector- and country-specific financial risks are additionally reflected by 
international investors, and these risks quickly transmit to the cost of money that each 
country and sector has to pay. 
Nevertheless, rural capital markets may also work imperfectly, e.g. because of transaction 
costs, liquidity constraints and informational imperfections. These imperfections affect both 
the supply and demand sides of the markets. As a result, many issues and characteristics of 
EU rural capital markets are important to address in order to make the market more efficient 
and support the development of local agricultural businesses within the EU that are 
competitive and resilient. 
One crucial issue is the existence of supply constraints in EU rural finance. The rural 
financial system often cannot supply funds to farms in amounts or on terms conducive to 
socially desirable levels of production and investment. Credit-rationed firms are not able to 
borrow the desired amount of capital. Credit rationing has been a prominent problem in the 
rural credit market in the past, especially when the overall credit markets were regulated. 
Now that the capital and credit markets have been liberalised, credit rationing is linked more 
to the informal efficiency of the market and to the size of risk premiums required in the 
lending rates than to explicit and quantitative lending constraints. More recently, the 
problems implied by excessive risk premiums have been further exacerbated, as European 
financial systems have become more unstable and fragile. Country-specific risk premiums 
embedded in the lending rates have substantially increased, and as a result loan rates in the 
rural capital market may have increased to the extent that rural firms no longer have fair 
access to credit. 
Credit rationing and excessive risk premiums embedded in the financial market have 
significant economic consequences, since they lead to under-investment, the under-
employment of production factors and under-production. Therefore, the standard approach 
within the EU has been that each time the EU has expanded, extensive structural adjustment, 
credit and investment programmes have been established to increase the supply of low-cost 
capital in the new member countries and better integrate them into the common market. The 
successive policy interventions have played an important role in economic integration 
processes. Even in old member countries, investment in more competitive agricultural 
structures has often been promoted through investment aid programmes, since the necessary 
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agricultural economist at the MTT Agrifood Research Finland, Economic Research in Helsinki. 
2 | PIETOLA, MYYRÄ & HEIKKILÄ  
investment would otherwise have been delayed and the sector would have slid into a low 
productivity trap. 
Various theoretical studies have also modelled credit constraint in general as well as in 
agriculture. A major group of models on credit constraint focuses respectively on adverse 
selection (hidden information) (e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Carter, 1988), moral hazard 
(hidden action) (e.g. Boot et al., 1991; Boucher et al., 2005), and costly contract enforcement 
and ex-post asymmetric information (e.g. Bester, 1994). Yet the empirical literature on rural 
credit constraints is considerably smaller (Benjamin and Phimister, 2002; Blancard et al., 
2006; Färe et al., 1990), and that on the EU even more so. 
To better understand the functioning of the EU’s rural capital markets and their effects, it is 
important to have information on the extent to which (rural) capital markets are integrated 
and linked to one another across the EU. Despite the importance of this issue, not many 
studies have analysed it, as most integration studies have concentrated on the integration of 
commodity markets. The few studies that do exist argue that capital markets are still rather 
segmented across the EU. For example, Ball et al. (2008) demonstrated that capital costs in 
agricultural production differ substantially among OECD countries. The price farmers pay 
when purchasing equipment is thus crucial to the competitiveness of agriculture in Europe. 
Moreover, differences in prices for the same equipment experienced by farmers in different 
member states constitute distortions in competition on the internal market. It is therefore 
important to relate these variations to differences in the institutional framework in capital 
markets across EU countries. 
In addition to studying horizontal market integration across the EU, it is also important to 
examine the role of vertical integration and its interaction with subsidies in the provision of 
rural finance. There is literature on the impact of credit subsidies on rural financial markets, 
and how they may affect the availability of farm credit (Binswanger and Deininger, 1997; 
Adams et al., 1984). In addition, other types of subsidies (e.g. subsidies from the common 
agricultural policy) may also affect farm credit. For example, farms may directly use the 
single farm payment to pay for farm activities and thus substitute for missing credit (Ciaian 
and Swinnen, 2009). Subsidies may also affect bank credit if future subsidies are used as 
collateral. This is especially important in the new member states and candidate countries, 
where imperfect competition and the unequal distribution of bargaining power within the 
agri-food supply chain can be observed. It has also been demonstrated that direct payments 
raise the expected value of marginal investment, because they reduce the risk of bankruptcy 
over the farmer’s operating time horizon and thus affect farm assets (Vercammen, 2007). 
Nevertheless, very few studies have identified this issue and none have empirically analysed 
the impact of vertical integration in the agri-food chain and farm access to credit, which may 
be particularly important in the new member states and candidate countries. 
Perhaps the reasons for the rarity of empirical analyses of the capital market lie in the lack of 
detailed financial statistics. Publically accessible statistics on the performance of rural capital 
markets are thin when compared, for instance, with commodity market statistics. Eurostat 
statistics, for example, include detailed statistics on commodity markets across European 
member states,1 but no information exists on the cost of capital that farmers face in European 
member states.  
This paper attempts to fill the gap in descriptive statistics by computing certain indicators of 
rural capital markets from public data sources. We describe the key indicators of financial 
market data to highlight how the capital markets in EU countries are linked to one another, 
and furthermore, how the rural capital markets are linked to the country-specific capital 
markets. In doing so, we first identify the cost of money (the borrowing rates) using different 
indicators. The benchmarks for the rural loan rates are taken from the interbank offered 
                                                        
1 See Eurostat’s website, “Statistics, Agriculture” (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/ 
page/portal/agriculture/data/database). 
AGGREGATE CAPITAL MARKETS | 3 
 
rates, government bond rates and household borrowing rates. We then look at the investment 
volumes and provide some insights into the potential role of agricultural investment 
programmes in the rural capital market. After this we move on to the leverage position and 
distribution of loans in EU agriculture. The leverage position in particular is expected to 
affect the risk exposure of farmers and thus to have a significant impact on the risk premiums 
charged for agricultural loans. The final section concludes.  
1. The cost of money: Interest rates  
In describing the cost of money, we have constructed indicators of the supply and demand 
sides of the market. The benchmark data on the aggregate supply side are measured by two 
types of interest rates. The first is the short-term, interbank offered rate. For the eurozone, 
these Euro InterBank Offered Rates (EURIBOR) were accessed from the Statistical Data 
Warehouse of the European Central Bank (ECB). Examples of member countries that have 
their own currencies were obtained from the websites of the countries’ own central banks. 
The second supply-side indicator is a selection of ten-year government bond rates paid in the 
secondary market. These data were also collected from the ECB’s website and the countries’ 
own central bank websites. The government bond rates reflect the country-specific cost of 
money, including the country-specific risk premiums, while excluding the borrower-specific 
effect, such as the sector funded. 
On the borrower and demand sides we have two distinct indicators. The first is the interest 
paid by households on new loans for housing purchases. The maturity of these loans varies 
between five and ten years. Still, these data do not represent the rural capital market alone. 
To the best of our knowledge, no separate data that are specific to the rural capital market are 
available from public sources of financial data. 
The second set of demand-side data is specific to the rural capital market and imputed from 
the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN). These data represent the effective interest 
rates paid on all outstanding loans, both short and long term, by agriculture and farming 
households as recorded in the FADN. At the same time, taking into account the distribution 
of loans between those with a short and long duration, these data actually represent quite 
well the other long-term indicators, as described above. About 82% of all agricultural debts 
are classified as long- or medium-term loans in the FADN, and these loans by definition have 
a duration of at least one year. The effective interest rates are computed from the amount of 
outstanding loans and the total amount of interest paid within each calendar year. 
For each country we further compute the difference between the household loan rate and the 
interest paid by farmers. The difference is later on referred to as the ‘agri premium’. In these 
comparisons, only the December 2008 data are used, since this is the last available year in 
the FADN at the time of writing this report. 
The FADN is a survey carried out by the EU member states. It collects accountancy data from 
about 80,000 agricultural holdings every year. The FADN is the only source of micro-
economic data that is harmonised, with the bookkeeping principles being the same in all EU 
member states. Only commercial agricultural holdings, defined by economic size (RI/CC 882 
Rev. 8.1), are included in the FADN, and therefore the data cover no more than 39% of all 
agricultural holdings. These farms nonetheless account for more than 90% of all commercial 
agricultural production in the EU.2 
The empirical data were collected from a database maintained by MTT Economic Research, 
Finland (www.mtt.fi/eufadn). The original data source is FADN-EC-DG AGRI/L3. In the 
FADN, the debts are presented in two variables: 1) long- and medium-term loans and 2) 
short-term loans. Short-term loans have a maximum duration of 12 months. The loans sum 
                                                        
2 Refer to the European Commission’s website, “Agriculture and Rural Development, Analysis, FADN” 
(http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/analysis/fadn/index_en.htm). 
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up to the total debt. Total external factors reduced from farm net value added to produce the 
farm net income are divided into three items: wages paid, rent paid and interest paid. Our 
interest is on interest paid. The cost of money is derived by dividing the interest paid3 by the 
total debt. Results for the accounting year 2008 are the latest ones available for this study. 
1.1 Interbank offered rates 
In the eurozone, the short-term rate is the EURIBOR for a one-year duration, as available 
from the ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse (Figure 1). Figure 1 also depicts the interbank 
rates for the UK (LIBOR, three months) and Denmark (CIBOR, three months) as examples of 
countries that have maintained their own currencies. 
These data suggest substantial variation in short-term rates across time. The rates have 
peaked three times since 1994. Besides the short-term peaks and cycles, the rates have 
followed a downward sloping pattern over time and decreased to historical lows in the 2010s. 
Subsequently, the rates have again turned towards an upward sloping trend. The data 
highlight that the country-specific short-term interbank rates outside the eurozone are not 
necessarily well synchronised with the EURIBOR, and in some countries such as the UK, they 
have substantially deviated from the EURIBOR rates. Nevertheless, the most recent 
monetary policies responding to the global financial crisis have been similar in the eurozone 
and outside it, with the interbank offered rates showing similar patterns across the currency 
zones. 
It is expected that the overall fluctuations in short-term interbank offered rates across time 
will also have implications for and spillover effects on rural and more local capital markets. 
Figure 1. One-year EURIBOR, three-month LIBOR and three-month CIBOR rates as 
monthly averages from April 1994 to April 2011 (ECB, Bank of England and 
Danmarks Nationalbank) 
 
1.2 Government bond yields 
The government bond yields are based on prices paid in the secondary markets and they 
reflect the country-specific risks more than the interbank offered rates. A selection of these 
rates is sufficient to highlight how the European capital market has recently changed. The 
ECB rate declined until autumn 2010 and thereafter began a rising trend. The government-
specific rates, however, had already started to increasingly deviate from one another in 
                                                        
3 Interest paid includes all interest, charges and fees related to debts. 
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autumn 2008 (Figures 2 and 3). Most of them continued sliding downwards, although some 
of them started to rise. In 2010 the bond yields showed large country-specific discrepancies 
and signalled significant country-specific risks. The variation in annual bond yields across 
countries has more than quadrupled within a three-year period since the beginning of 2008 
(Figure 3). 
It is likely that the large deviations in bond yields will have implications for and spillover 
effects on the rural capital markets in different countries. This spillover effect on rural capital 
markets is further examined below. 
Figure 2. Bond yields – Central government bonds (bullet issues), ten-year maturity,  
in selected European countries* (monthly averages in the secondary market) 
Panel 2a 
 
Panel 2b  
 
* Only those countries that have sufficient data for ten-year bond yields in the public domain are 
depicted in the figure. 
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Figure 3. Standard deviation (% from the average) of government bond yields across the 
selected countries, from September 2006 to April 2011 
 
Note: The countries are those shown in Figure 2. 
1.3 Borrowing rates for housing purchases 
Our first indicator on the borrowing side is the household rate paid in lending for house 
purchases, excluding revolving loans and overdrafts, convenience and extended credit card 
debt. These loans are classified as having a maturity of over five and up to ten years. The data 
were obtained from the MFI Interest Rate Statistics of the ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse.  
Similar to the bond yields, these interest rates suggest that the current capital market or at 
least the risk premiums included in the borrowing rates differ substantially among European 
countries (Figure 4). The eurozone does not seem to define a homogeneous market regime or 
draw a line between euro countries and countries outside the eurozone. The rates display 
wide variations across the countries within the eurozone, and most of the borrowing rates in 
national currencies closely follow the euro average. Thus, the deviations seem to be country-
specific rather than currency-specific. 
Figure 4. The household borrowing rates in selected European countries* (%) 
Panel 4a. Eurozone countries 
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Panel 4b. Non-eurozone countries 
 
* Only countries that have sufficient data for household borrowing rates in the public domain of the 
ECB are depicted in the figure. 
Source: MFI Interest Rate Statistics from the ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse. 
1.4 Loan rates paid by agriculture 
As mentioned above, at least to our knowledge there are no consistent statistics on interest 
rates that have been paid by agriculture and by rural capital markets in European countries. 
Therefore, we have imputed an approximation for these interest rates using the financial 
accounts of the FADN. The interest rate paid for agricultural loans is computed by dividing 
the total annual interest payments by the total amount of outstanding loans at the end of the 
year. The resulting approximation of the interest rate does not distinguish between short- 
and long-duration credits, but it roughly corresponds to the duration of the above-reported 
long-term bond yields and household borrowing rates, since most agricultural loans are long-
term loans. On top of the interbank offered rates, these rates should involve country-specific 
risk premiums, comparable with those of bond yields and household borrowing rates. In 
addition, they account for the sector-specific characteristics of local agricultural capital 
markets in rural areas. These characteristics include risk premiums on agricultural funding, 
the implications of potential credit constraints, and in some countries also interest rate 
support paid through their structural adjustment and investment programmes in agriculture. 
The standard is that EU accession has resulted in extensive structural-adjustment 
programmes in agriculture in new member countries. 
The average interest rate paid for all EU agricultural loans over the 20-year period of 1989–
2008, as recorded in the FADN, was 5.6%. This rate was 4.0% at its lowest in 2005 and 2006, 
and 7.9% at its highest in 1991. 
The data further suggest that the interest rates paid for agricultural loans followed quite well 
the general financial patterns and other interest rates in Europe (Figure 5). There have 
nonetheless been a few deviations. First, the agricultural loan rates were substantially below 
the government bond rates in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The discrepancy then gradually 
shrank until 1997, when the agricultural loan rates and the bond rates coincided. Thereafter, 
agricultural rates stayed at the same level as bond rates. One reason may be that increasing 
liquidity and decreasing market rates not only transmitted to the agricultural loan rates but 
they also reduced the effective interest rate support involved in agricultural loans. 
Second, agricultural interest rates seem to exhibit smoother patterns than the interest rates 
for long maturity bonds and loans. Yet this seemingly significant difference may result from 
computational differences. In agricultural loans, the borrowing rate represents the stock of 
all outstanding loans, whereas the other indicators are based on new household loans and 
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current interest rate quotations for government bonds. The rates for new loans and 
quotations in the secondary bond market probably reflect the changing market environment 
more rapidly than the corresponding rates for all outstanding loans. If financial institutions 
change their margins, for example, the new margins will be applied faster to new loans than 
to the outstanding stock of all loans. 
Like government bond and household borrowing rates, the rates for agricultural loans began 
to increase in 2007, even though the interbank rates continued to decrease. These data 
suggest that the first signals of the systemic government risks in overall European economies 
emerged in 2007. These risks also started to take hold in the agricultural credit market and 
interest rates. Thus, although the agricultural and food sector could at least potentially 
exhibit counter-cyclical characteristics when compared with other economic sectors, the 
counter-cyclicality is not reflected in the agricultural credit market and interest rates. 
Figure 5. Interest rates for agricultural loans in the EU: The ECB ten-year bond yield, the 
lending rate for household purchases (2003–) and one-year EURIBOR (1994–)*  
 
* These three rates are based on July quotations for each year. We also computed geometric averages 
for each year from the monthly quotations. These averages give a similar picture of interest rate 
movements as the July quotations.  
Our data on agricultural loan rates and bond rates only overlap for the three years of 2006 to 
2008. These overlapping years nevertheless suggest that agricultural loan rates varied 
substantially more across countries than bond rates (Figure 6). Thus, either the distribution 
of risks embedded in the agricultural capital market was larger than in the market for 
government bonds, or alternatively, the local credit constraints or policy interventions varied 
among countries, implying substantial country-specific deviations in agricultural loan rates. 
It is notable that the new member states joining the EU in 1995 and 2004 did not have a large 
impact on the standard deviations of agricultural loan rates across countries. It remains to be 
seen how the recent developments in the European financial market will finally affect the 
agricultural credit market. It is likely that the increasing variations in government bond rates 
among countries will also transmit to the agricultural credit market, which has already shown 
much larger differences across countries than, for instance, household borrowing rates. 
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Figure 6. Standard deviation (% from the average) of agricultural loan rates and 
government bond yields across the selected countries*  
 
* The bond yields are taken for September and the countries are those shown in Figure 2. 
For country comparisons, we computed geometric means of agricultural loan rates for each 
member country over the years 2004–08 (Figure 7). For this period, the average rate paid for 
the total EU agricultural loan stock was estimated at 4.2%. Although most of the country-
specific rates were close to the average of 4.2%, the spread of the rates was wide at the tails. 
The rate was highest in Greece (11%) and lowest in the Czech Republic (2.0%). Thus, the 
highest rate was more than twice the average and the lowest at less than half of the average. 
Figure 7. Geometric mean of agricultural loan rates* in 2004–08 in the EU member 
countries (%) 
 
* The average rate represents all loans in EU agriculture, i.e. the rate is weighted by the outstanding 
loans. 
Since general loan rates and bond rates vary among countries, the absolute country-specific 
differences do not, as such, reveal the agriculture-specific deviations from the general credit 
markets in different countries. Therefore, we further computed an interest rate premium that 
was paid in agricultural loans in each country in 2008. This agricultural premium, the ‘agri 
premium’, is defined as the difference between the agricultural loan rate and the rate paid for 
household loans (Figure 8). 
The agri premium ranged between -4.9% and +4.4% and was negative in seven countries. 
The lowest agri premiums were in Lithuania (-4.9%), Latvia (-4.3%), Hungary (-3.8%) and 
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Poland (-2.8%). In the Czech Republic, the agri premium was also negative (-2%), and 
because the country’s general loan rates were also low, the negative agri premium reduced 
the agricultural interest rates to the lowest level among EU countries. These figures clearly 
evidence investment aid programmes based on loan rate subsidies for agriculture. This aid is 
not necessarily transparent or accessible in either the income statements or the balance 
sheets. 
The agri premiums were highest for Greece (+4.4%), Denmark (3.5%), Slovakia (3.0), Cyprus 
(2.6) and Sweden (2.4). At the same time, even though the agri premiums were lower for 
Ireland and Portugal, for instance, than in Sweden, their agricultural loan rates were 
substantially higher than those in Sweden, since the overall loan rates in these countries were 
high. Such high agri premiums must be related to excessive risks or a strong demand for 
loans in agriculture compared with other industrial sectors. In Denmark and Slovakia, the 
size of farms has increased very rapidly. Thus, banks might have felt uncertain when 
financing this growth. On the other hand, farms in Greece and Cyprus have been operating 
almost solely based on their own capital. This might indicate that farms have experienced 
credit rationing by some institutional setting. 
Figure 8. Interest rates for agricultural loans across the EU in 2008  
 
Sources: ECB; long-term interest rates for assessing convergence among the EU member states and 
FADN-EC-DG AGRI/L3 (http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rica/), 21 March 2011. 
2. Investment 
The total gross investment in EU agriculture increased from €20 billion at the end of the 
1980s to over €40 billion in 2008 (Figure 9). The aggregate investment pattern nevertheless 
suggests that investment primarily grew during EU enlargements, e.g. in 2004. Thus, the 
structural adjustment programmes implemented in the new member countries have played a 
role in these aggregate development figures.  
Net investment was negligible, varying at around zero for most of the time. The economic 
recession in the early 1990s also caused agricultural investment to plunge to such a low level 
that the net investment was clearly negative. The most recent data show some signals that net 
investment could be increasing.  
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Figure 9. Gross and net investment in EU agriculture (€ billion) 
 
 
When we normalise the investment figures per farm, the patterns are still quite similar to 
those at the aggregate level (Figure 10). The net investment varied at around zero, but the 
gross investment increased from about €5,000 to almost €10,000 per farm. Notably, 
however, the increase in average farm size is still embedded in these figures. In other words, 
the gross investment per farm rose as a function of increasing farm size. 
If we further normalise the investment figures per capita, the gross investment patterns 
become flatter than those above (Figure 11). The gross investment initially varied at around 
€100 per capita and then grew to around €120 per capita, being at its highest level of €133 
per capita in 2007. Net investment again varied at around zero and at its highest was €22 per 
capita in 2008. 
Figure 10. Gross and net investment in EU agriculture (€1,000 per farm) 
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Figure 11. Gross and net investment in EU agriculture (€ per capita) 
 
3. The role of investment support  
The average share of investment support in total gross investment in EU agriculture, as 
recorded in the FADN, was 4% over the period 1989–2008. The annual variation of this 
share was small, being 3.2% at its lowest in 2000 and 4.8% at its highest in 2006. 
In 2008, investment support on average accounted for 4.7% of total gross investment in the 
EU (Figure 12). The variation among countries of the role of investment support in gross 
investment was high. For example, in Luxembourg (176%) and Estonia (262%), the amount 
of investment aid exceeded the gross investment. This seemingly unrealistic outcome might 
be owing to differences among countries in the bookkeeping principles implemented for 
investment aid. The highest level of per-farm investment aid in 2008 was recorded in 
Slovakia (€14,137 per farm). 
Investment aid was absent in Sweden, and a very low level of investment aid, totalling less 
than 1% of gross investment, was recorded for Bulgaria, the Netherlands and Denmark. 
Figure 12. Investment aid as a percentage of gross investment in 2008*  
 
* Percentages in Luxembourg (176%), Estonia (262%) and Cyprus (69%) exceeded the scale used. 
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4. Financial leverage and debt structure  
4.1 Financial leverage (gearing) 
The geometric average of financial leverage (gearing) for EU agriculture was 14.6% over the 
period 1989 to 2008 (Figure 13). It rose by more than 2 percentage points during the 1980–
90 recession. Thereafter, it decreased to a low of 13% and started to increase again in 1999. In 
2008, the financial leverage soared from 14.1 to 17.9%. The jump of almost 4 percentage 
points within a year was higher than ever before in our sampling period and twice the size of 
the jump in the 1980–90 recession. The jump was due to significantly increased debts. On 
average, debts on EU farms increased from €39,118 in 2007 to €50,022 in 2008. At the same 
time, equity decreased slightly from €235,574 to €229,046. These results may provide the 
first signals of how the recent financial crisis has also hit the agricultural sector in the EU.  
Figure 13. Overall financial leverage (gearing)* in EU agriculture (%) 
 
* Gearing is calculated as the debts divided by the sum of debts and equity. 
 
The degree of financial leverage varies considerably among countries (Figure 14). In 2008 it 
was lowest in Greece (0.6%) and highest in Denmark (49%). It is notable that in countries 
such as Greece, Spain and Ireland, the financial leverage of agriculture does not reflect the 
high leverage position of the public sector. The small size of debts per farm and especially per 
economic size unit (ESU) in these countries suggests that the low level of financial leverage in 
agriculture stems from small amounts of debt rather that high equity prices.  
In Denmark and the Netherlands, which are in the opposite tail of the distribution, the high 
degree of financial leverage results from large amounts of debt per farm and per ESU rather 
than from low equity prices. In these countries the country-specific risk embedded in the 
government bond market is still low, but if it increases and interest rates peak, the economic 
feasibility of highly leveraged agricultural holdings may be jeopardised.  
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Figure 14. Financial gearing in agriculture in EU countries in 2008 (%) 
 
 
Figure 15. Debts per farm among EU countries in 2008 (€ per farm) 
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Figure 16. Debts per farm among EU countries in 2008 (in € per ESU)  
 
4.2 Spatial distribution of debts and assets  
Owing to the lack of coverage of the total outstanding loans in EU agriculture in the FADN 
data and statistics, the figures are normalised and presented in a percentage form (Figure 17).  
Figure 17. Distribution of outstanding loans and farmers’ total capital in EU agriculture 
among member states in 2008 
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Denmark, where the debts per farm are the highest, the average farmer pays annual interest 
payments of €82,233 on his/her total debts of €1,174,426. At the other end of the scale are 
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by farmers in the EU but carry only 3.5% of all debts. The proportions of debts and capital are 
almost equal in the Baltic countries, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. In Luxembourg, Slovakia, 
Malta and Bulgaria, these shares are also in balance. Spain differs clearly from other EU 
countries. Spanish farmers account for 20.2% of all agricultural capital, but only 2.1% of all 
agricultural debts. 
4.3 Distribution of short- and long-term debts 
There are considerable differences in agricultural debt structures among the EU member 
states. These structures are represented by the ratio of short- to long-term debts (Figure 18). 
In new member states such as Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and Lithuania, a major 
proportion of total debts consists of short-term loans and credit. This credit is needed for the 
day-to-day operations of farms. The share of short-term loans is also sizable in the UK 
because the total debt compared with the turnover of UK farms is small. Belgium represents 
those member states in which all loans are long- or medium-term loans and are thus 
probably used for funding agricultural investment. Long- or medium-term loans also 
predominate in Finland, Denmark and Slovenia.  
Figure 18. Allocation of total agricultural loans between short- and long-term loans in the 
EU member states in 2008 
 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
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informational inefficiencies, risk premiums and constraints, than the European financial 
markets in general. 
It is notable that early in the sampling period the interest rates varied across countries much 
more in the agricultural credit market than in the secondary market for government bonds 
and household lending. It is likely that the country-specific variations in the agricultural 
leverage positions and accordingly the risk premiums charged for agricultural loans may have 
contributed to the large variations in agricultural loan rates. The negative agriculture-specific 
premiums observed also suggest that investment support has contributed to and reduced the 
agricultural lending rates in several countries. 
Towards the end of our sampling period in agriculture in 2008, the data provide the first 
signals of growing financial instability and the current financial crisis in Europe. The 
instability started to significantly increase government bond yields and household lending 
rates in some countries, and this increase was gradually transmitted to the agricultural credit 
market. At the total EU level, the agricultural borrowing rates had already begun to show a 
rising trend in 2007, but they remained at a relatively low level. In 2008 the average 
borrowing rate was estimated at 4.7%, which was still below the 5.6% average rate over the 
20-year period of 1989–2008 and quite close to the all-time low of 4.0% observed in 2005 
and 2006. 
Perhaps the most dramatic signal of financial instability also hitting agriculture was the 
sudden worsening of the financial leverage (gearing) rate. In 2008 the gearing rate rose by 
almost 4 percentage points to 18%. Before 2008 it had remained quite stable, ranging 
annually between 13 and 16%. The 4 percentage-point rise observed in 2008 was twice the 2 
percentage-point rise observed during the economic recession in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. 
The emerging financial crisis was not yet reflected in increasing variance in agricultural 
borrowing rates across countries for two reasons. First, the country-specific variance in 
agricultural borrowing rates had also been wide in the past. Second, in a large number of 
countries, agricultural loan rates had not yet increased much and the rates had remained 
close to the EU average. Dramatic changes were only observed in the tails of the distribution, 
where the interest rate discrepancies were the largest. At the uppermost end of the tail the 
agricultural loan rate increased to about 11% (Greece), while at the lowest end of the 
distribution the corresponding rate remained at 2.3% (Czech Republic). 
The different market regimes within each financial sector are country-specific and not 
defined by the currency zones. There is considerable divergence both within and outside the 
eurozone. It seems that the turbulence and instability has been even greater and the 
borrowing rates have peaked even higher in some euro countries than in countries outside 
the eurozone with their own currencies. 
It is characteristic of the agricultural credit market that countries differ in their regulations 
and have more or less aggressive expansion strategies. Therefore, the leverage positions of 
agricultural firms differ substantially among countries. The most leveraged agricultural 
sectors and the largest risk exposures to increasing borrowing rates in the agricultural credit 
market are found in Denmark, which is outside the eurozone. Thus, the consequences of the 
spread of financial stability beyond the eurozone could in some cases be exacerbated, with 
the crisis having serious direct effects for the European agricultural sector. 
The distribution of the financial leverage of agriculture across countries does not reflect the 
distribution of country-specific risk premiums in the manner that they are observed in 
government bond yields. Therefore, in those countries that have the weakest financial 
situation in the public sector and in which the local interest rates are embedded in high 
country-specific risk premiums, the agricultural sector is not directly exposed to a very large 
risk of increasing interest rates, since it is not so highly leveraged. An example of these 
countries is Spain, where the financial leverage (gearing) rate is only 2.2%, while the average 
gearing among all EU countries is 18% and the highest country averages for gearing rates 
18 | PIETOLA, MYYRÄ & HEIKKILÄ  
reach 50%. The differences in the distributions of government and agricultural leveraging, as 
such, will provide some hedge for the European agricultural sectors against the financial 
problems in the public sector. Nevertheless, the dynamic financial spillover effects and 
economic implications through revised budget policies will also expose agricultural sectors to 
large risks in these countries. 
Agricultural gross investment within the EU grew from €20 billion in 1980 to more than €40 
billion in 2008. The main reason for this growth, however, was the continual increases 
brought about by the enlargement of the EU. If we normalise agricultural investment per 
capita, the investment pattern was smooth and rose only slightly, from about €100 to €130 
per capita. The net investment varied at around zero, but at the end of the sampling period in 
2008 it had increased to a clearly positive level. As the net investment ranged most of the 
time at around zero, it may not fully explain the increasing leverage positions. 
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